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Chinese shoppers in Beijing. Photo by available at under Creative Commons license

01:20 pm | September 3, 2019

Let's Talk About China's GDP

Through the strength of its economic growth figures year after year, China has projected an image of fundamental economic strength. But a closer look at the numbers exposes profound structural issues that should help cool down fear and envy in the West.  

By Wen Kejian

However you read China’s economic numbers, they point to dramatic change over the past four decades. Many of these numbers will already be familiar to European readers. But let's run through some of the essentials — before we subject the assumptions that come with them to greater scrutiny. 

First, according to official data, the average GDP growth rate in China from 1978 to 2018 was 9.5 percent. Per capita GDP rose during that period from 100 dollars to more than 9,000 dollars. China’s total GDP last year exceeded 90 trillion yuan, or about 13.6 trillion dollars at current rates of exchange.



  • Since the "opening up and reform" policy, economic performance has become a core source of ruling legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. To deal with this political imperative, statistical distortions and manipulations are inevitable.
  • With the pattern of infrastructure-led GDP growth, China's apparent economic strength does not reflect the efficiency of resource usage and wealth accumulation.The high-speed rail network with its expanding public debt, for example, is criticised as "a gray rhino".
  • The largest danger for China's economy is its high dependency on the overheated real estate market, more than a quarter of outstanding loans in the financial system is related to this sector, and more than 77 percent of household assets are vested in housing.
  • To delay the bursting of the real estate bubble, China has been pumping liquidity into the economy so the gap between M2 and GDP is widening. The US accuses China for gaining an unfair advantage by lowering its exchange rate. But the real problem is, with abandoning capital controls and free convertibility of the yuan against the dollar, the RMB would go into free fall.


The International Monetary Fund (IMF) puts total global GDP in 2018 at 84.84 trillion dollars, which has China accounting for 16.03 percent, second only to the United States (with a GDP of 20.5 trillion dollars). Globally speaking, this means that China is now the world’s second-largest economic power. 

Changes to China’s economic landscape behind the figures have been equally profound. The middle class — as determined by home and car ownership — has now reached roughly 300 million. One in 900 Chinese are US-dollar multimillionaires, and one in 14,000 Chinese are billionaires. As a result, China has become the world’s largest market for luxury cars as well as other luxury goods.

Who gets to claim credit for what some have called a “miracle”?

This is a subject of some disagreement. But it is fair to say that China’s rapid economic growth over the last 40 years owes to a large extent to the policy of so-called “opening up and reform,” or gaige kaifang (改革开放), and the Chinese Communist Party leadership can certainly accept some kudos in this regard. The policy relaxed restrictions on economic activity; it spurred people on in their desire to make money; it improved the rules of the economic game; and in most cases, it encouraged respect on the part of the government for basic property rights and the validity of contracts.

But if we may break from all of this positive talk, it’s important to note that some troubling signs have emerged in recent years. Part of this has to do with the values promoted and defended by this now undisputed economic power. Despite dramatic changes to China’s economy and society, the Chinese Communist Party's tolerant attitude toward economic development is driven purely by opportunism. Economic opening can be abided only so long as it sustains the Party’s long-term monopoly on political power. 

For investors and entrepreneurs in China, this is an underlying source of risk and concern—the sense that ideology could turn the tables at any moment. 

At the same time, even as it celebrates its newfound international role, China is undergoing a process of state “rejuvenation”  driven by a deep current of nationalism — the operative phrase for Xi Jinping being “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." This has contributed to the sense globally that China presents a challenge to the international order led by the United States. Negotiations between China and the US over the past year have failed to resolve deep-rooted differences, and may actually have intensified the sense of conflict.

Negotiations between China and the US over the past year have failed to resolve deep-rooted differences, and may actually have intensified the sense of conflict.


For several years now, it seems many people in the West and elsewhere in the world have gotten hot under the collar about China and the challenge posed by its newfound economic and political strength. At this point, it is a good idea, therefore, to re-examine the real picture presented by the Chinese economy, and to recognize the deep structural problems it faces. Part of the problem stems from China’s political system itself, which is hardwired to inflate its virtues and downplay its vices in such a way that we can never accept its numbers at face value. 

It’s possible that a more sober look at China’s economy might cool the fires just a bit and help avoid serious miscalculations from which none of use will benefit. For the sake of everyone who has a stake in the global economy — and that’s all of us — better calculations are in order.

China’s Paradoxes

As I said before, the Chinese Communist Party is within its rights in claiming some of the credit for China’s economic development over the past four decades. But the truth is that it often demands too much of the credit. After the Communist Party came to power in 1949, decades of poor governance — and that is really putting it mildly — resulted in tremendous tragedies that prompted profound questions about the legitimacy of the Party’s rule. 


Deng Xiaoping arrives in the United States in 1979, just as economic reforms in China are getting underway. Public domain image from Wikimedia Commons

The policy of “opening up and reform” initiated after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 was meant initially to avert economic collapse, and only later served as a source of ruling legitimacy as the economy developed successfully. 

The deeper question of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party has hung constantly over China’s economic development these past 40 years, which means that recession, so to speak, is off the table. Keeping the economy in positive territory is not just an urgent economic matter, but an even more urgent political one. Whatever the real economy looks like, the apparent economy must never be allowed to look like it’s in bad shape. 

To deal with this political imperative, special consideration or tailor-made economic results are sometimes necessary within the statistical system in China. If economic performance deteriorates, statistical distortions and manipulations are inevitable. Aside from the overarching Party imperative of legitimacy and economic performance, we must consider that GDP growth has always — over the past 40 years, at any rate — been an important factor considered when the Communist Party evaluates the political performance of officials to consider promotion. 

Statistical secrets are concealed within this malformed system, and in order to identify and understand these secrets, we must look at the Chinese economy differently — arriving at quite a different picture. 

One challenge is to deal with frequent reporting of obvious paradoxes. For example, how can China report double-digit increases in industrial production when both electricity consumption and taxable sales experience significant declines. That simply isn’t possible. An increase in production should mean manufacturers are using more, not less, energy. 

This is why The Economist originally introduced the so-called “Li Keqiang Index,” named for China’s premier, as an alternative way of assessing economic growth in China. The index was based on three key indicators: electricity consumption, rail freight and bank loans. The index was considered a better indicator to reflect China’s economic reality than official GDP figures, and for a little while, the index became popular even in official Chinese media outlets. That popularity was short-lived, however, because the index, and the potentially embarrassing gaps with the official numbers, ran up against the political imperative. 

One of the most typical distortions of economic statistics in China can be spotted by looking at difference between the aggregate data of each province and total countrywide data. For nearly every year of the past decade, going back to 2009, China’s provinces have reported more aggregate GDP than is reported for the country by the National Bureau of Statistics. In 2017, for example, the national figure was nearly 1 trillion RMB short of the aggregate GDP of the provinces. 

4- Provincial GDP and National GDP of China-03 (2).jpg

From time to time, domestic media criticize these statistical distortions. In December 2015, a report by the official Xinhua News Agency reported exaggeration of economic data in three northeastern provinces that was so extreme that some counties in this region were reported to have GDPs exceeding that of Hong Kong. 

In 2018, both Inner Mongolia and the municipality of Tianjin were found to have laundered their GDP figures for 2016. Under immense public pressure, Inner Mongolia eventually reduced its aggregate industrial output value for 2016 by 290 billion yuan — wiping 40 percent off of its original figure. The Tianjin Binhai New Area, a district under the jurisdiction of Tianjin, cut its reported 2016 GDP by 33 percent. 

The politics and mathematics behind these reductions are complicated, but the cases certainly show just how flexible and arbitrary official data can be. 

Consistently over-reported provincial aggregate GDP figures in China, surpassing national GDP, can be seen as statistical proof of a political system in which officials are under pressure to exaggerate their merits. 


Senior officials in the National Bureau of Statistics have previously gone on record saying that the sense of “rule of law” is poor in the reporting of economic numbers, and that statistical fraud is endemic in spite of the fact that there are laws on the books clearly prohibiting such practices. The laws, however, actually have tough competition when it comes to the rules of political advancement. Many provinces are driven to falsify date in the first place in order to compete for position and ranking, which is linked to career prospects. 

Consistently over-reported provincial aggregate GDP figures in China, surpassing national GDP, can be seen as statistical proof of a political system in which officials are under pressure to exaggerate their merits. 

Naturally, the gap between provincial and national figures has also led to more fundamental questions about whether official statistics are credible at all. In fact, the reputation of China’s national statistics hardly fares any better. 

When numbers are too perfect, this naturally leads to suspicion. This principle often applies to China when published official data on GDP growth lines up perfectly with official GDP goals. Are Chinese economic prognosticators just that good? Or are they self-fulfilling their own prophecies? 

In 2017, for example, the official GDP target was set at 6.9 percent. When the results came back for the first quarter of 2017, China had recorded a GDP growth rate of, you guessed it, 6.9 percent. In the second quarter, the GDP growth rate again came out to 6.9 percent. Growth rates for the third and fourth quarters followed the pattern. There were no surprises. But the perfect figures prompted doubts and suspicions about the accuracy of the official data. 

Some international research institutions have suggested that China’s real GDP growth rate could be much lower than the published figures. The Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank, published a research report in March this year that systematically analyzed Chinese economic data from 2008 to 2016. The report concluded that the annual economic growth rate had likely been exaggerated by 2 percentage points in recent years, and that as a result China’s total economy might be about 12 percent smaller than official data would lead people to believe. 

The Brookings report reinforces longstanding doubts about the veracity of official statistics on China’s economy, and it suggests the economy might be not just objectively smaller than currently believed, but performing more poorly. 

Breaking and Building

Even if we do have accurate numbers for GDP as a reflection of output for a given period of time, GDP often fails to reflect how efficiently or inefficiently resources were utilized. In countries like China, official data can be deceptive on this count as well — and GDP in particular can be a poor indicator of real economic results and wealth accumulation. 


China is known for its seeming obsession with the construction of property and infrastructure. Is this the most efficient use of resources? Photo by Gauthier Delacroix available at under Creative Commons license

A friend of mine living in Shenzhen has made an observation that I think is perhaps very significant — and that is that the local government in the city, which is one of the country’s most vibrant economically, has the habit of allocating funds toward the end of each fiscal year on the building and repairing of roads. The phenomenon, he says, is unmistakable. Workers hired by the government dig up roads that are in perfectly serviceable condition and then repair the same roads all over again. In some cases, they uproot perfectly good trees on the roadside and then replant them right where they were. 

As government budgets for such projects expand, the activity becomes an ever-present part of daily life. Roads heading east, north, west and south all seem to be in a state of repair, the state-of-the-art digging machines buzzing with activity all day long. 

This activity — the unending destruction and re-construction of the city — should not be at all surprising if we understand the political imperative of GDP reporting. It is a key mechanism of inflating GDP while satisfying a handful of vested interests with the government contracts to do such work. Macro-level analysis of economic growth patterns in China would suggest that a large proportion of GDP is achieved through inefficient, ineffective and completely unnecessary economic activities. My friend just happened to observe this happening at street level through his daily observation. 

The Chinese government has actively practiced Keynesianism for the past several decades, applying increased government expenditures to stimulate economic data growth — if not necessarily the economy itself — through depressive cycles. This can happen through proactive fiscal spending (the redundant repair of Shenzhen roads being one of many examples), or through large-scale investment in infrastructure that can be used to hedge against or postpone impacts of the economic cycle. 

The question of whether these economic measures can actually lead to wealth accumulation or public happiness is another story altogether. 

High-Speed Waste

Perhaps one of the best showcases of this pattern of infrastructure-led growth is the construction of China’s high-speed rail network. Since 2005, the building of the high-speed rail system has been one of the country’s most important infrastructure projects. Today, China’s high-speed rail system boasts the largest total mileage of any comparable network in the world, and high-speed rail is hailed as a source of immense national pride. 

Towering behind this signature national network, however, is a mountain of public debt that cannot be acknowledged or talked about. The national railway operator alone has born total debt in excess of 5 trillion RMB, or 726 billion dollars. This is one state-run company incurring debt greater than the GDP of Switzerland or Taiwan (705 billion and 589 billion respectively in 2018). 


A high-speed train waits in the Suzhou Railway Station. Image by Sharon Hahn Darlin posted to under Creative Commons license. 

But with the exception of just a handful of high-speed lines, such as the Beijing-Shanghai and Beijing-Guangzhou lines, nearly all of China’s high-speed rail routes are operating under capacity, incurring losses on a daily basis. The Lanzhou-Xinjiang line, built with capacity to run more than 160 pairs of high-speed trains daily only runs just four pairs daily. The income derived from the line is not even sufficient to pay the line’s electricity bill. 

China’s dense high-speed rail network may be the world’s largest, but it also has one of the lowest transport densities in the world. The network is a substantial financial risk for the country — and a dear price to pay for national prestige. According to official data, between 2013 and 2017, the China National Railway Corporation had to make RMB interest payments of 215.7 billion (US$31 billion), 330 billion (US$48 billion), 338.5 billion (US$49 billion) and 540.5 billion(US$78 billion) in order to service its mountain of debt. Since 2016, interest payments have exceeded the network’s total operating income. 

Economically speaking, China’s high-speed rail network is a disaster of massive proportions. Earlier this year, Caixin, one of China's most influential financial media outlets, initiated a public debate about the debt problem of the high-speed rail network, calling it “a gray rhino”: a highly probable, high impact yet neglected threat.

To exacerbate matters, it is a disaster that is moving forward at high-speed, with debt constantly expanding. 

Economically speaking, China’s high-speed rail network is a disaster of massive proportions.


And China’s high-speed rail network is just one of numerous examples of how China’s GDP has been distorted through wasteful spending. We can add to the long list many road and highway projects, subway networks, airports, and a slew of other government projects. All of these have contributed to China’s enviable GDP growth, but with extreme inefficiencies. 

No discussion of China’s GDP can be complete, of course, without touching on the country’s real estate sector. 

Jack's Beanstalk

Since 2000, China’s real estate market has grown at a prodigious rate. In 2000, Chinese residents bought 143 million square meters of commercial housing, and the average selling price nationwide was 2,103 RMB (US$305) per square meter. By 2018, the average transaction price of commercial housing had rocketed to 8,544 RMB per square meter (US$1,241). All told, real estate and related industries account for more than a quarter of total private fixed-asset investment in China, and real estate has become an undisputed pillar industry in the national economy.

But the real estate sector in China is a massive bubble, a trend we can see clearly if we look at the ratio of housing sales prices to media household incomes. 

A 2016 report by a research group from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences revealed that the price-to-income ratio in Beijing was 33.2. In Shanghai, the price-to-income ratio was 31.9. And in Shenzhen, it was the highest of all, at 33.5. Even if this set of data is not completely accurate, there is no disputing that the price-to-income ratio for housing in China’s first and second-tier cities is higher than in most major cities in the world. 

Housing prices have not surprisingly been a constant source of public resentment in China. 

China’s top property developers, which have expanded dramatically over a short period of time, are all driven by massive debts. The top five developers in terms of sales have debts with interest totaling up to 1.585 trillion RMB. These include: Evergrande Group (debt of 676.2 billion ; Country Garden (debt of 294.5 billion); Vanke (debt of 179.4 billion); Sunac Real Estate Group (debt of 209.8 billion); and Poly Real Estate (debt of 225.1 billion). These debt figures are given by the Hong Kong stock Exchange, where all of these companies are listed. 

China’s growing real estate bubble is doubly concerning when you consider that real estate has become the most important carrier of Chinese household assets. According to the “2018 Urban Household Wealth Report” jointly released by China Guangfa Bank and Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, as much as 77.7 percent of household assets in China are vested in housing. In Beijing and Shanghai, this figure could be as high as 85 percent. By comparison, the average figure in the United States is just 34.6 percent.


Visitors to Beijing's Urban Planning Exhibition Center look at a scaled models of the the Chinese capital's urban development. Photo by "cea+" available at under Creative Commons license. 

It’s clear that the property sector, by far the most important sector in China’s economy, is solidly in bubble territory, regardless of which numbers you look at. This abnormal real estate market is enabled by the Chinese Communist Party’s tight control over land supply, and by a financial system that favors the rich and the connected. In fact, the real estate sector and China’s financial system are closely intertwined, with more than a quarter of outstanding loans in the financial system being related to the real estate sector. This means that China’s banking system is highly exposed to the real estate sector. The fates of the two sectors are now braided together, making them resistant to structural adjustments — a situation not unlike that of Japan’s economy in the 1980s. 

China's real estate market is not like the magic beanstalk in the English fairytale, stretching endlessly into the sky until it reaches a cloud castle of riches. The national economy cannot keep growing indefinitely. All bubbles must burst eventually, causing economic shock and reversal of fortune. After three decades of impressive growth, Japan’s housing bubble burst, leaving in its wake two decades of stagnated growth. 

If China’s real estate bubble were to burst, the Chinese economy would experience a strong contraction, enduring a long period of stagnation. This would have unforeseen social and political consequences. To fend off such a terrible prospect, the Communist Party has long been been working overtime to delay the bursting of the real estate bubble and avoid painful market adjustments that someday must come. 

Below is a chart showing the growth in China of so-called “broad money,” or M2, which includes cash and checking deposits, as well as savings deposits, money market securities, mutual funds, and other time deposits. M2 is generally watched very closely by economists as an indicator of money supply and possible future inflation, and as a target used in the monetary policy of central banks. 

5- China’s Money Supply (M2)_version2.jpg

The chart shows a surge of M2 in recent years, which reflects the pumping of liquidity into the economy so that the bubble I talked about just now can be sustained, avoiding a reckoning. 

Now let’s look at the growth rate of M2 against the growth rate of GDP in China. We can see from the chart below that while M2 is steadily rising, the gap between M2 and GDP is also steadily widening. This tells us that China is expending ever greater amounts of liquidity in order to sustain smaller and smaller GDP returns. 

6-China m2 and gdp_version2.jpg

When the same amount of GDP requires more money as the medium of exchange, this indicates that the monetary supply is becoming less effective in stimulating economic growth.

Why is this happening? 

To a large extent, this trend can be attributed to the current economic structure in China, where financial resources are dominated by entrenched vested interests — essentially, well-connected businesspeople with close connections in the Party-state apparatus, and state-owned enterprises. The upshot is that bank credit is being consumed by central and local-level state-owned enterprises, local government financing platforms and other privileged financial institutions. 

The loose monetary policy becomes like a zombie feeding game. China’s zombie companies — indebted businesses that have only sufficient funds to service loan interest, but not actual debt, once they have covered their running costs and fixed costs (such as wages and rent) — continue to consume more and more of the available financial resources, but without real and tangible yields. 

But this inefficient allocation of financial resources means that the Keynesian model of easy money to stimulate economic growth will gradually come to an end.


American economist Hyman Minsky outlined what became known as the "Minsky moment," a sudden and massive collapse of asset values following a long period of apparently stable prosperity and investment gain that invited under-calculation of overall market risk, and encouraged over-investment of borrowed money. Photo from Wikimedia Commons available under Creative Commons license. 


China’s soaring debt is the starkest warning. Over the past decade, China has accumulated 20 trillion dollars in fresh debt, far more than the amount resulting from quantitative easing in the developed world. Some analysts estimate that China’s debt-to-GDP ratio has hit 260 percent, well above the average for developing countries and far higher than that seen in developed countries, including Germany, the US, Australia and Canada.

Such a high ratio of debt to GDP has severe implications. Just remember my example of the high-speed rail system, in which the burden of interest payments far exceeds economic yields. China is advancing step-by-step toward its "Minsky moment," an onset of market collapse generated by reckless speculation. 

Another obvious outcome, of course, is inflation. Thanks to the magic of China’s statistical regime, the country’s official inflation rate remains low. But given the continued flood of liquidity and soaring debt levels, one must assume inflation as a natural consequence. In fact, anyone who has lived in China in recent years can testify to the toll inflation has taken on the daily lives of the people. 

There have been jokes about the multi-billionaires of Zimbabwe during the period of hyperinflation in 2009, when you could carry around in your pocket a 100 trillion dollar bill, and yet have virtually no spending power. Such an extreme scenario may seem distant and unimaginable in China today. But given the government’s unchecked power of money creation, severe inflation is already in the making, and it could eventually consume a sizable proportion of China’s wealth. 

The Mirror of History

If we look internationally, there is a prerequisite for sustaining China’s huge asset bubble and its growing tide of broad money — and that is the exchange rate. 

Just imagine for a moment that China’s RMB could be exchanged freely. If this happened, market participants could convert RMB into dollars or other currencies that are supported by better assets. This in turn would constrain the Chinese government’s fiscal policy options.

China cannot have the impossible. It could not find some magic way around Robert Mundell’s “impossible trinity,” that concept in international economics that tells us it is not conceivable to have, all at once, a fixed and stable foreign exchange rate, free movement of capital and an independent monetary policy. If a country wishes to allow capital flows but to maintain an independent monetary policy, it will find it difficult to keep the exchange rate stable. Alternatively, if a country maintains a fixed exchange rate but requires capital flows, it must abandon the notion of an independent monetary policy. 

How does China approach each of the three angles of this “impossible trinity”? 

Among these policy objectives, it’s clear that China has abandoned the free flow of capital — thereby preserving the necessary space for an independent monetary policy and a relatively stable exchange rate. Without the free flow of capital, however, the exchange rate does not represent a real market value, but instead is symbol of the distortion created by the political will of the Chinese Communist Party to avoid the bursting of its bubble. 

Imagine, though, what a 50 percent depreciation of the RMB exchange rate would mean. The country’s US-dollar GDP would contract by 50 percent, and China would no longer be regarded as a country on the threshold of developed status. 


China’s manipulation of capital flows and exchange rates over the past several years is an elaborate story that deserves greater attention than it has received. I won’t wade into this mire, my point simply being that controls on capital flows and manipulation of the exchange rate have allowed China to maintain the illusion that its massive bubble is not a bubble. Imagine, though, what a 50 percent depreciation of the RMB exchange rate would mean. The country’s US-dollar GDP would contract by 50 percent, and China would no longer be regarded as a country on the threshold of developed status. 

History serves as a mirror. And those with some understanding of economic history would agree with me that this outcome, as difficult as it is to imagine, is not at all an impossibility. 

China’s “big brother” last century, the Soviet Union, also once boasted of being the world’s second-largest economy. But its centrally planned economy entered its final stages in the 1980s, and changes to the exchange rate are what ultimately served to unravel the economy. In 1988, when the official exchange rate for Soviet rubles to US dollars remained 0.5, the black market prices was actually five rubles to the dollar. 

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia introduced “shock therapy” to restructure its economy. This came with a loosening of monetary policy and the issuing of 18 trillion rubles. This pushed inflation rates up to 2,000 percent, and brought a dramatic decline in the value of the ruble. By November 1994, the official exchange rate of the ruble had fallen to 3,235 to the dollar. In the year 2000, new rubles were issued to replace the old ones at 1:1000, which essentially meant that one US dollar was now worth 28,000 old Soviet rubles. Devaluation wiped out the old ruble-denominated wealth of the Soviet Union. 


What will your RMB be worth if the bubble bursts? Photo by Eric Pesik available at under Creative Commons license. 

But there are examples closer at hand. During the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, Indonesia’s currency suffered rapid depreciation, losing 80 percent of its value after 30 years of steady economic development. Indonesia’s GDP contracted by 70 percent as a result of the crisis, with per capita GDP dropping to under 2,000 dollars at a single stroke.

A country proudly counted among the “Asian tigers” became a poor country once again, and it would be another 20 years before Indonesia fully recovered. 

The people of the Soviet Union and Indonesia suffered greatly during these sharp economic downturns. My point here is not to suggest that China or the Chinese people will necessarily follow the same fate. But we must recognize that China’s strict capital controls mean that its asset prices cannot be adjusted on a global scale. This means that China’s inflated GDP has not yet endured a pressure test in an environment of free exchange. 

China’s huge economic bubble is like a barrier lake formed in a river basin after an earthquake or landslide. The river gathers up behind the mass of earth and stone, swelling larger and larger — though anyone looking at the lake’s surface might believe that everything is calm. It is impossible to foresee what the collapse of this barrier lake would mean globally, and the full extent of the flood waters that would be discharged. 

China’s increasingly strict capital control policies have strengthened the barrier over the past two or three years. But the real cost of these capital controls is difficult to calculate, and this is ultimately part of the pressure building behind. With time, however, capital controls will stifle economic growth and contribute to a financial crisis with Chinese characteristics.

Currency manipulation has been a constant gripe in the ongoing trade war between China and the United States, and the US has repeatedly accused China of gaining an unfair advantage by artificially lowering its exchange rate. There is now even talk in the US of taking further measures to fight back by weakening the dollar. For a certain time, such complaints might have been true, and the responses necessary. But the situation is changing as China takes on more and more debt, further inflating its economic bubble. 

There is concern in the West that globalization has, to quote an article this year in Foreign Policy, “created a Chinese monster” — an economically massive authoritarian country with great big global ambitions. These fears probably vastly underestimate China’s deep structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities. If China were to give up its capital controls and allow the free convertibility of the yuan against the dollar, the RMB would likely go into free fall and devalue so substantially that China’s GDP would contract significantly. When the dust cleared, China’s economic power might not seem so frightening after all. 

In order to hedge against tariff increases from the United States, China allowed the RMB exchange rate to drop to a rate of 7 against the dollar, an important psychological barrier. This, which could be seen as just the first in a series of exchange rate assaults, caused turmoil in the markets. But this carefully controlled devaluation, far from alleviating the pressures caused by the barrier lake of China's debt-driven growth, simply stores up greater kinetic energy for the release of future shock waves. 

The numbers may tell us a story very unlike the one we have become so used to hearing. Until China’s economy is subjected to a real pressure test, we have no way of knowing whether the monster is real, or whether the whole world is dreaming. 



China Myths

Perceptions of China are often driven by frames, or myths, that hinder our understanding of the facts. Where do these myths come from? And what assumptions are we making when we employ them? 

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Let's Talk About China's GDP

September 3, 2019
Wen Kejian

Wen Kejian is a Hangzhou-based entrepreneur, independent economic analyst, and columnist for various Chinese media.